The Planteome project provides a suite of reference and species-specific ontologies for plants and annotations to genes and phenotypes. Ontologies serve as common standards for semantic integration of a large and growing corpus of plant genomics, phenomics and genetics data. The reference ontologies include the Plant Ontology, Plant Trait Ontology, and the Plant Experimental Conditions Ontology developed by the Planteome project, along with the Gene Ontology, Chemical Entities of Biological Interest, Phenotype and Attribute Ontology, and others. The project also provides (...) access to species-specific Crop Ontologies developed by various plant breeding and research communities from around the world. We provide integrated data on plant traits, phenotypes, and gene function and expression from 95 plant taxa, annotated with reference ontology terms. (shrink)

Reflective essay focusing on a discussion of personal identity issues with ninth grade students.

Reflective essay focusing on a discussion of personal identity issues with ninth grade students.

Reflective essay focusing on a discussion of personal identity issues with ninth grade students.

Background and objectives: Developmental coordination disorder is a neurodevelopmental motor disorder occurring in 5-6% of school-aged children. It is suggested that children with DCD show deficits in motor learning. Transcranial direct current stimulation enhances motor learning in adults and children but is unstudied in DCD. We aimed to investigate if tDCS, paired with motor skill training, facilitates motor learning in a pediatric sample with DCD.Methods: Twenty-eight children with diagnosed DCD were randomized and placed into a treatment or sham group. Anodal (...) tDCS was applied in conjunction with fine manual training over 5 consecutive days. Children's motor functioning was assessed with the Purdue Pegboard Test and Jebsen-Taylor Hand Function Test at baseline, post-intervention and 6 weeks following intervention. Group differences in rates of motor learning and skill transfer/retention were examined using linear mixed modeling and repeated measures ANOVAs, respectively.Results: There were no serious adverse events or drop-outs and procedures were well-tolerated. Independent of group, all participants demonstrated improved motor scores over the 5 training days [F, p < 0.001, 95% CI ], with no skill decay observed at retention. There was no interaction between intervention group and day [F, p = 0.086, 95% CI ].Conclusion: Children with DCD demonstrate motor learning with long-term retention of acquired skill. Motor cortex tDCS did not enhance motor learning as seen in other populations. Before conclusions of tDCS efficacy can be drawn, additional carefully designed trials with reproducible results are required.Clinical Trial Registration:ClinicalTrials.gov: NCT03453983. (shrink)

In 2018-2019, at the Keck School of Medicine of the University of Southern California, we developed and piloted a narrative-based health systems science intervention for patients living with HIV and medical students in which medical students co-wrote patients’ life narratives for inclusion in the electronic health record. The pilot study aimed to assess the acceptability of the “life narrative protocol” from multiple stakeholder positions and characterize participants’ experiences of the clinical and pedagogical implications of the LNP. Students were recruited from (...) KSOM. Patients and staff were recruited from the Maternal, Child, and Adolescent/Adult Center for Infectious Disease and Virology at Los Angeles County+USC Medical Center. Ten patients, seventeen students, and ten MCA staff participated in the pilot study. Qualitative methods were used to gather data from students’, patients’, and staff’s perspectives. Three themes emerged from the thematic analysis: patients’ life narratives conveyed their unique life experiences and voices; the protocol could result in wide-ranging effects on HIV care; the LNP enabled students to contribute value to patients’ healthcare. Across groups, participants considered the LNP an acceptable intervention. The LNP, its limitations, and implications for HIV care, narrative medicine, and health information technology are presented. (shrink)

The experience of pain is subjective, yet many people have their pain invalidated or not believed. Pain invalidation is associated with poor mental health, including depression and lower well-being. Qualitative investigations of invalidating experiences identify themes of depression, but also social withdrawal, self-criticism, and lower self-worth, all of which are core components of shame. Despite this, no studies have quantitatively assessed the interrelationship between pain invalidation, shame, and depression. To explore this relationship, participants recounted the frequency of experienced pain invalidation (...) from family, friends, and medical professionals, as well as their feelings of internalized shame and depressive symptoms. As shame has been shown to be a precursor for depression, we further explored the role of shame as a mediator between pain invalidation and depressive symptoms. All sources of pain invalidation were positively associated with shame and depressive symptoms, and shame fully mediated the relationship between each source of pain invalidation and depression. Relative to other sources, pain invalidation from family was most closely tied to shame and depression. Overall, findings indicate that one mechanism by which pain invalidation may facilitate depression is via the experience of shame. Future research may explore shame as a potential upstream precursor to depression in the context of pain. Findings provide more insight into the harmful influence of pain invalidation on mental health and highlight the impact of interpersonal treatment on the experiences of people in pain. (shrink)

Science is driven by technical innovations, and perhaps nowhere as visibly as in neuroscience. In the past decade, advances in methods have led to an explosion of studies in cognitive (Gazzaniga et...

In recent years, there has been a heated debate about how to interpret findings that seem to show that humans rapidly and automatically calculate the visual perspectives of others. In the current study, we investigated the question of whether automatic interference effects found in the dot-perspective task (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010) are the product of domain-specific perspective-taking processes or of domain-general “submentalizing” processes (Heyes, 2014). Previous attempts to address this question have done so by implementing inanimate (...) controls, such as arrows, as stimuli. The rationale for this is that submentalizing processes that respond to directionality should be engaged by such stimuli, whereas domain-specific perspective-taking mechanisms, if they exist, should not. These previous attempts have been limited, however, by the implied intentionality of the stimuli they have used (e.g. arrows), which may have invited participants to imbue them with perspectival agency. Drawing inspiration from “novel entity” paradigms from infant gaze-following research, we designed a version of the dot-perspective task that allowed us to precisely control whether a central stimulus was viewed as animate or inanimate. Across four experiments, we found no evidence that automatic “perspective-taking” effects in the dot-perspective task are modulated by beliefs about the animacy of the central stimulus. Our results also suggest that these effects may be due to the task-switching elements of the dot-perspective paradigm, rather than automatic directional orienting. Together, these results indicate that neither the perspective-taking nor the standard submentalizing interpretations of the dot-perspective task are fully correct. (shrink)

We argue that voluntary mental health registries integrated into the 9-1-1 system, where patients and caregivers can establish a repository of this information, will help fill this information gap by enabling first responders to quickly understand the context of a call for service with a mental health component, and to make better informed decisions. Despite valid concerns about privacy, stigma, and the potential misuse of protected health information, such registries, if carefully designed and administered, can improve the health outcomes of (...) 9-1-1 calls for service involving mental health-related crises. (shrink)

At a 2011 meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers, N. T. Wright offered four reasons for rejecting the existence of soul. This was surprising, as many Christian philosophers had previously taken Wright's defense of a disembodied intermediate state as a defense of a substance dualist view of the soul. In this paper, I offer responses to each of Wright's objections, demonstrating that Wright's arguments fail to undermine substance dualism. In so doing, I expose how popular arguments against dualism fail, (...) such as dualism is merely an unwarranted influence of Greek culture on Christianity, and substance dualism is merely a soul-of-the-gaps hypothesis. Moreover, I demonstrate that Wright himself has offered a powerful reason for adopting substance dualism in his previous works. In conclusion I offer a view that explains why the human soul needs a resurrected body. (shrink)

We extend attribution and stakeholder theory in the context of crisis reputation management by examining differences in stakeholder perceptions in the form of organization-related blame. We presented eight stakeholder groups with factual information surrounding the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and asked them to indicate the extent to which they blamed the leaders and organizations associated with the event. Stakeholders also completed a survey assessing their attribution styles. Results indicated that perceptions of blame were affected by the interaction of stakeholder role (...) (i.e., active vs. passive) with attribution style (i.e., optimistic vs. pessimistic). Our results suggest that organizational leaders’ understanding of their stakeholders may be an important aspect in managing stakeholders’ sensemaking during crises. (shrink)

Huw Price has developed versions of naturalism and anti-representationalism to create a distinctive brand of pragmatism. ‘Subject naturalism’ focuses on what science says about human beings and the function of our linguistic practices, as opposed to orthodox contemporary naturalism’s privileging of the ontology of the natural sciences. Price’s anti-representationalism rejects the view that what makes utterances contentful is their representing reality. Together, they are to help us avoid metaphysical ‘placement problems’: how e.g. mind, meaning, and morality fit into the natural (...) world. By combining subject naturalism and his own ‘global’ version of expressivism with Robert Brandom’s inferentialism about content, Price proposes a pragmatist ‘anthropology’ as a replacement for substantively metaphysical approaches to placement problems. In this paper I argue that Price’s project cannot succeed, and that this shows something important about what form pragmatism ought to take. Price’s view doesn’t work because no subject naturalist vocabulary is sufficient to describe any assertional practice; there is no way to connect his expressive-functionalist explanations to the practices and concepts which are their subject – nor, even, to the human subjects who are the focus of a philosophical anthropology. I close by suggesting how we might improve on these shortcomings of Price’s pragmatism. (shrink)

Pre-philosophically, an artwork can lie in virtue of some authorial intention that the audience comes to accept as true something that the author believes to be false. This thought forces a confrontation with the debate about the relation between the interpretation of a work and the intentions of its author. Anti-intentionalist theories of artwork meaning, which divorce work meaning from the actual author’s intentions, cannot license the judgment that an artwork lies. But if artwork lying is a genuine possibility, then (...) anti-intentionalism must be rejected as false. (shrink)

Childhood adversity is associated with altered or dysregulated stress reactivity; these altered patterns of physiological functioning persist into adulthood. Evidence from both preclinical animal models and human neuroimaging studies indicates that early life experience differentially influences stressor-evoked activity within central visceral neural circuits proximally involved in the control of stress responses, including the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC), paraventricular nucleus of the hypothalamus (PVN), bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST) and amygdala. However, the relationship between childhood adversity and the (...) resting-state connectivity of this central visceral network remains unclear. To this end, we examined relationships between childhood threat and childhood socioeconomic deprivation, the resting-state connectivity between our regions of interest (ROIs), and affective symptom severity and diagnoses. We recruited a transdiagnostic sample of young adult males and females (n= 100; mean age = 27.28,SD= 3.99; 59 females) with a full distribution of maltreatment history and symptom severity across multiple affective disorders. Resting-state data were acquired using a 7.2-min functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) sequence; noted ROIs were applied as masks to determine ROI-to-ROI connectivity. Threat was determined by measures of childhood traumatic events and abuse. Socioeconomic deprivation (SED) was determined by a measure of childhood socioeconomic status (parental education level). Covarying for age, race and sex, greater childhood threat was significantly associated with lower BNST-PVN, amygdala-sgACC and PVN-sgACC connectivity. No significant relationships were found between SED and resting-state connectivity. BNST-PVN connectivity was associated with the number of lifetime affective diagnoses. Exposure to threat during early development may entrain altered patterns of resting-state connectivity between these stress-related ROIs in ways that contribute to dysregulated neural and physiological responses to stress and subsequent affective psychopathology. (shrink)

Alexander Pruss’s Principle of Sufficient Reason states that every contingent true proposition has an explanation. Pruss thinks that he can plausibly maintain both his PSR and his account of libertarian free will. This is because his libertarianism has it that contingent true propositions reporting free choices are self-explanatory. But I don’t think Pruss can plausibly maintain both his PSR and libertarianism without a rift occurring in one or the other. Similar to the old luck/randomness objection, I contend that Pruss’s libertarianism (...) is susceptible to what I call “the inexplicability objection”, which attempts to show that agents’ free choices involve contingent brute facts. Pruss may be able to partially explain a proposition such that Jones freely chose A for reason R, but he cannot adequately explain a contrastive proposition such as that Jones freely chose A for R rather than B for R*. The result is that either PSR is too explanatorily permissive for libertarianism, or libertarianism is too explanatorily impermissive to satisfy PSR. After considering what I take to be Pruss’s best response to the inexplicability objection, I conclude that his attempt to reconcile PSR and libertarianism is unsuccessful. (shrink)

It’s strange that sleep doesn’t come up more when we think of virtue. In this paper, I argue that there is a virtue concerned with sleep, which I call “somnience,” and I develop an account of this virtue. My account of somnience builds on the virtue tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas and recent research about the nature of sleep. In the first section I argue that there is a need for such a virtue. Next, I argue that somnience is a (...) form of temperance. Third, I show how somnience connects to a number of other virtues, which helps us fill out the nature of the virtue. Finally, I argue that sleep also relates to virtue by aiding virtue formation. (shrink)

At the end of the 19th Century, substance dualism-roughly, the thesis that the human person is comprised of a substantial immaterial soul and a physical body-was widespread. Materialism was not a live option. As U.T. Place observed, [Ever] since the debate between Hobbes and Descartes ended in apparent victory for the latter, it was taken more or less for granted that whatever answer to the mind-body problem is true, materialism must be false. This sociological fact changed quickly bringing about what (...) William James described as "the evaporation of the definite soul-substance." Arthur O. Lovejoy deemed the 20th century as "the Age of the Great Revolt against Dualism." The inevitable defeat of substance dualism was assumed a foregone conclusion. Gilbert Ryle had, in the words of Daniel Dennett, "danced quite a jig on the corpse of Cartesian dualism.". (shrink)

In contemporary political discussions, it is depressingly common to see people criticized for expressing impure beliefs. Moreover, those who sometimes defect from their tribe are criticized for failing to be firmly enough on the side of the angels. We consider explanations for this behavior, including its relationship to moral grandstanding. We will also argue, on both moral and epistemic grounds, in favor of a norm against “blocking the exits.” We should not use social pressure to discourage people from publicly changing (...) their minds. (shrink)

In this paper, we describe how critical data designers have created projects that ‘push back’ against the eclipse of environmental problems by dominant orders: the pioneering pollution database Scorecard, released by the US NGO Environmental Defense Fund in 1997; the US Environmental Protection Agency’s EnviroAtlas that brings together numerous data sets and provides tools for valuing ecosystem services; and the Houston Clean Air Network’s maps of real-time ozone levels in Houston. Drawing on ethnographic observations and interviews, we analyse how critical (...) data designers turn scientific data and findings into claims and visualisations that are meaningful in contemporary political terms. The skills of critical data designers cross scales and domains; they must identify problems calling for public consideration, and then locate, access, link, and create visualisations of data relevant to the problem. We conclude by describing hazards ahead in work to leverage Big Data to understand and address environmental problems. Critical data designers need to understand what counts as a societal problem in a particular context, what doesn’t, what is seen as connected and not, what is seen as ethically charged, and what is exonerated and discounted. Such recognition is produced through interpretive, ‘close reading’ of the historical moment in which they operate. (shrink)

[This is a paper that was originally written in 2017 and doesn't represent Silva's current thinking about degrees of confidence, conviction, and rationality.] Can there be knowledge and rational belief in the absence of a rational degree of confidence? Yes, and cases of "mistuned knowledge" demonstrate this. In this paper we leverage this normative possibility in support of advancing our understanding of the metaphysical relation between belief and credence. It is generally assumed that a Lockean metaphysics of belief that reduces (...) outright belief to degrees of confidence would immediately effect a unification of coarse-grained epistemology of belief with fine-grained epistemology of confidence. Scott Sturgeon has suggested that the unification is effected by understanding the relation between outright belief and confidence as an instance of the determinable-determinate relation. But determination of belief by confidence would not by itself yield the result that norms for confidence carry over to norms for outright belief unless belief and high confidence are token identical. We argue that this token-identity thesis is incompatible with the neglected phenomenon of “mistuned knowledge”—knowledge and rational belief in the absence of rational confidence. We contend that there are genuine cases of mistuned knowledge and that, therefore, epistemological unification must forego token identity of belief and high confidence. We show how partial epistemological unification can be secured given determination of outright belief by degrees of confidence even without token-identity. Finally, we suggest a direction for the pursuit of thoroughgoing epistemological unification. (shrink)

In this book, T. L. Short corrects widespread misconceptions of Peirce's theory of signs and demonstrates its relevance to contemporary analytic philosophy of language, mind and science. Peirce's theory of mind, naturalistic but nonreductive, bears on debates of Fodor and Millikan, among others. His theory of inquiry avoids foundationalism and subjectivism, while his account of reference anticipated views of Kripke and Putnam. Peirce's realism falls between 'internal' and 'metaphysical' realism and is more satisfactory than either. His pragmatism is not verificationism; (...) rather, it identifies meaning with potential growth of knowledge. Short distinguishes Peirce's mature theory of signs from his better-known but paradoxical early theory. He develops the mature theory systematically on the basis of Peirce's phenomenological categories and concept of final causation. The latter is distinguished from recent and similar views, such as Brandon's, and is shown to be grounded in forms of explanation adopted in modern science. (shrink)

It’s common to think that animals think. The cat thinks it is time to be fed, the monkey thinks the dominant is a threat. In order to make sense of what the other animals around us do, we ascribe mental states to them. The cat meows at the door because she wants to be let in. The monkey the monkey fails the test because he doesn’t remember the answer. -/- We explain animal actions in terms of their mental states, just (...) as we do with humans. One of us has argued that our science of animal minds requires that animal behavior be explained in such terms, and this doesn’t lead to a problematic use of folk psychology or anthropomorphism (Andrews 2016, 2020). By “anthropomorphism” we mean the attribution of human psychological, social, or normative properties to non-human animals “usually with the implication it is done without sound justification” (Shettleworth 2010, 477). And by “folk psychology” we mean the commonsense practice of seeing action as caused or accompanied by mental states like belief and desire, emotions, and seeing people in terms of their moods or personality traits, as well as categorizing complex behaviors as examples of grieving, communicating, or teaching (Andrews 2012). Psychologists routinely describe human behaviors in folk psychological terms, so it’s not that the categories are unscientific. The issue with using folk psychology to describe animal behavior is whether observable similarities between human and nonhuman behavior warrants thinking they involve the same psychological kind. The use of folk psychology when talking about animals need not be problematically anthropomorphic, though we need some evidentiary basis for filing animal behavior under some folk psychological category. -/- Despite it being commonplace for humans to attribute thoughts to animals, and there being arguments in favor of doing so in science, the nature of these mental states so many are happy to see in other animals remains unclear. To help bring some focus into the discussion, we will examine the attitude of belief. In this chapter we will examine the various possible statuses of animal beliefs, and the implications of those various views for our folk practice as well as our scientific investigations. (shrink)

The author states: "in a recent article searle has shown the odd irrelevance of russell's criticisms of frege in the famous paper 'on denoting'. I here offer an explanation of the oddity: russell had excusably, But wrongly, Conflated frege's distinction between sinn and bedeutung with his own distinction between what an expression 'means' and what it 'denotes'.".

This book is an attempt to give a completely extensional account of belief without recourse to entities such as propositions and the like. This is done by developing a semantical metalanguage and instead of alluding to such intensional elements as meanings, the talk is rather of individuals, virtual classes, and relations. A Quinean kind of paraphrastic program is used, making explicit time references and belief conditions, as well as the above objects of belief. They are all keyed to the user (...) of a specific language through Martin's use of testing and acceptance as primitive notions, giving the entire project a behavioristic flavor. These particular primitives have been chosen in view of the supposition that they have clear experimental meanings and that they are crucial to the logical analysis of experimental method. The upshot of Martin's approach is an analysis of belief in terms of their relational characteristics. Hence, on his view, we cannot properly speak of knowledge and belief, but only of knowing and believing. In the course of developing his logic of belief, Martin manages to touch upon a wide range of topics. Quine's notion of ontic commitment is expanded to include "ontic involvement"--a second order commitment involving the objects of Martin's metalanguage. Arguments are offered against the contemporary view that there are a multiplicity of logics: "One God, one country, one logic" being the professed underlying maxim of his book. There is a longish discussion marking out a distinction between facts and events, modeled after his account of belief. A brief chapter reassesses and defends Frege's notion of Sinn in terms of Martin's logical machinery. Interspersed throughout are commentaries on a number of figures, such as Russell and Carnap, Hintikka and von Wright. Included also is a chapter on human action based on a distinction between action types and action events. There, Davidson's analysis of action sentences is criticized in terms of the 'Fido'-Fido principle. The extensive use of symbols seems cumbersome, but is perhaps necessary given the nature of Martin's enterprise.--K. T. (shrink)

Die von Nietzsche und Friedrich Schlegel entwickelten philologischen Theorien weisen bestimmte Ähnlichkeiten auf, die deren grundsätzliche philologische Konzeptionen und Verfahrensweisen bestimmen. Ausgehend von Walter Benjamins Idee einer romantischen Kunstkritik, die ihr Objekt im Moment seiner Kritik verfolkommnet, versucht dieser Beitrag zu demonstrieren, dass Schlegels und Nietzsches Wende von einer auf Praxis bezogenen zu einer fundamental-theoretische orientierten Philologie mit der Formulierung eines Verständnisses der griechischen Kultur verbunden ist, das diese als kritisches Instrument für eine Transformation der gegenwärtigen Kultur anwenden will. Durch (...) dieses gemeinsame kulturkritische Ziel entpuppen sich Schlegel und Nietzsche als Zukunftsphilologen in dem Sinne, dass ihre anwendung philologischer Einsichten auf die zeitgenössische Kulturpraxis die ideologiekritische Tendenz von bestimmten heute praktizierten philologischen Richtungen vorwegnimmt.Nietzsche's and Friedrich Schlegel's philological theories share certain similarities that extend into their deeper philological conceptions and methodologies. Taking at its point of departure Walter Benjamin's notion of a Romantic art criticism that perfects its object in the monument of its critique, this essay attempts to demonstrate that when Schlegel and Nietzsche turn from philological practice to a more fundamental theory of a proper philological methodology, each seeks to formulate an understanding of Greek culture that can be applied as a critical tool for the transformation of their own present-day culture. This common cultural-critical thrust reveals Schlegel and Nietzsche to be future-oriented philologists in the sense that their application of philological insights to contemporary cultural concerns anticipates the ideology-critical direction evident in certain forms of philology as practiced today. (shrink)

......Mathematics coincides with Frege's theory of Sinn and Bedeutung...argued that in cases where Frege would say we recognize over...successful.) With this sort of elucidation, then, I indeed proposed to...use of . . .', or between Frege's 'einen Sinn ausdruckeri.....

Nicht historisierend, wie es in der Kant-Exegese zumeist geschieht, sondern in systematischer Absicht wird Kants Moralphilosophie aus dem Kontext seines Gesamtwerkes der kritischen Periode interpretiert. So werden jene Themen-bereiche erschlossen, die eine jede Ethik berücksichtigen muß, wenn sie als systematisch vollständig gelten möchte. Dadurch werden neue Sichtweise auf traditionelle Probleme der Ethik Kants ermöglicht und Schnittstellen zu neueren Debatten aufgewiesen. Ein Kernstück der Arbeit bilden die Deutungen des moralischen Sinns der ästhetischen Urteile über das Schöne und das Erhabene sowie der (...) teleologischen Urteile der Natur- und Geschichtsbetrachtung. Durch eine Explikation verschiedener Erfahrungsbegriffe wird es möglich, den Typus des kantischen Moralisten als Lebensform zu verstehen. (shrink)

Geht es Ihnen auch manchmal so, dass Sie von grundsätzlichen Fragen angerührt werden? Fragen wie "Wer bin ich?" oder "Was ist der Sinn des Ganzen?" Dann sind Sie hier genau richtig! Identität und Sinn sind die Themen, um die dieses Buch kreist. Gekreist wird dabei in Form eines Gedankenspiels um die Identität eines Fussballs, der sich nacheinander in die Identitäten des Spielballs, des Einzelspielers, des Teammitglieds, des Zuschauers, des Publikums, des mit der Welt Verbundenen und des das All (...) Ahnenden versetzt und schliesslich lernt, aus dem Tanz auf verschiedenen Hochzeiten eine eigene Hyper-Identität und damit auch einen eigenen Hyper-Sinn zu schöpfen. Wir sind mehr liefert in lockerer Form Impulse für Ihre Suche nach Identität und Sinn - unabhängig davon, ob Sie sich für Fussball interessieren oder nicht... (shrink)

Heutige Sprache besteht aus versteinerten Formen, denen zu widersprechen für die meisten Menschen widersinnig erscheint. In diesem Empfinden des Widersinns im Widersprechen manifestiert sich psychischer Widerstand, der überwunden werden muß, indem er für alle, die davon betroffen sind, bewußt gemacht wird. Weil die Bewußtwerdung abgewehrter Inhalte ein Vorgang ist, der im Verlauf psychoanalytischer Behandlung oder Selbstbefragung bzw. Selbstinfragestellung zustande kommt, versuche ich die wesentlichen Ursachen für psychischen Widerstand aufzuzeigen.

The quest for the one "Truth" in a pluralist society seems to have become as redundant as it is problematic - in much the same way that the idea of one "God" being the all-determining reality has. Yet we have not given up searching and the word "God" still continues to polarize, whether in society, theology or philosophy. In view of this seeming paradox, Friederike D. Rass seeks an alternative route that goes off the beaten track and beyond the temptation (...) to resignedly retreat to relativist or fundamentalist positions. She argues that it is precisely the supposedly futile quest for a single "Truth" as well as the continuous questioning of the meaning of the word "God" that provide an essential guide to responsible action today. (shrink)

Der Gedanke, der im Folgenden artikuliert und entfaltet werden soll, besagt, dass Sinn und Gedächtnis in einem internen Zusammenhang stehen. Das heißt näherhin: Sinn ist gedächtnishaft, und Gedächtnis ist nur richtig zu verstehen, wenn es von der zeitlichen Tiefenstruktur des Sinns aus expliziert wird. Die Weise, in der dieser Gedanke ausgeführt und begründet werden soll, ist eine systematische Entwicklung in zwei Zügen: Zum einen gilt es, die basale und implizite Gedächtnishaftigkeit des Sinns zu charakterisieren; zum anderen werden Formen (...) des expliziten Gedächtnisses auf dieser Grundlage neu verstanden und als Reflexionsfiguren der Zeitlichkeit des Sinns ausgewiesen. Die Absicht, die ich dabei verfolge, ist eine doppelte: die irreduzible, in der jüngeren Sprachphilosophie auffällig ignorierte Zeitlichkeit des Sinns ins Licht zu setzen; die Bedeutung und den Wert von Formen des Gedächtnisses zu erschließen, die auch Teilen der jüngeren kulturwissenschaftlichen Diskussion als defizient oder irrelevant erscheinen. (shrink)

Dass wir es in der westlichen Modernität mit einer säkularisierten Welt zu tun haben, mit einer atheistischen Welt, wo die Religion die öffentliche Sphäre nicht mehr beherrscht, wird für allzu selbstverständlich gehalten. Mit anderen Worten: Die Transformation von einer Welt, wo der Sinn außerhalb dieser Welt liegt, zu einer Welt, wo er innerhalb derselben liegt. Folgen wir dem Gedankenlauf, den der französische Philosoph Jean-Luc Nancy in seinen Werken The Sense of the World und Dis-Enclosure zum Vorschein bringt, dürfen wir (...) die Welt nicht als eine den Sinn innehabende auffassen, sondern müssen sie selbst als Sinn betrachten. In einer säkularisierten Welt zu leben heißt, in einer Welt zu leben, die selbst der Sinn ist, in einer Welt, die für sich selbst verantwortlich geworden ist, sich aber nie in sich verschließt. Nancy, dadurch von Martin Heidegger inspiriert, behauptet, in der säkularisierten Welt sei keine Frage mehr, ob die Welt über den Sinn verfüge, sondern er beteuert, die Welt sei der Sinn. Wollen wir heute Atheisten sein, folgert Nancy, müssen wir uns nicht mehr mit der Frage befassen, „warum es im Allgemeinen etwas gibt“, sondern mit der Antwort „es gibt etwas, und dies allein ergibt einen Sinn“. (shrink)

"...wenn wir etwas näher zusehen und den Aufbau der exakten Wissenschaft einer genaueren Prüfung unterziehen, dann werden wir sehr bald gewahr, daß das Gebäude eine gefährlich schwache Stelle besitzt, und diese Stelle ist das Fundament. Dem Bau fehlt eine von vornherein nach allen Richtungen hin gesicherte, von äußeren Stürmen nicht zu erschütternde Grundlage, oder mit anderen Worten: es gibt für exakte Wissenschaft kein Prinzip von so allgemeiner Gültigkeit und zugleich von so bedeutsamem Inhalt, daß es ihr als ausreichende Unterlage dienen (...) kann. Wohl rechnet sie allenthalben mit Maß und Zahl und trägt daher mit vollem Recht ihren stolzen Namen; denn die Gesetze der Logik und der Mathematik müssen wir ohne Zweifel als zuverlässig betrachten. Aber auch die schärfste Logik und die genaueste mathematische Rechnung können kein einziges fruchtbares Ergebnis zeitigen, wenn es an einer sicher zutreffenden Voraussetzung fehlt. Aus nichts läßt sich nichts folgern." (Max Planck, S. 5 f. in diesem Buch) Der deutsche Physiker Max Planck (* 23. April 1858 in Kiel, † 4. Oktober 1947 in Göttingen) gilt als Begründer der Quantenphysik. Im Jahr 1919 wurde ihm der Nobelpreis für Physik für das Jahr 1918 verliehen. 1941 hielt Planck einen vielbeachteten Vortrag über das Fundament der "exakten" Wissenschaften, zu denen auch die Pysik gezählt wird. Lange vergriffen liegt sein Vortrag "Sinn und Grenzen der exakten Wissenschaft" nun in einer ungekürzten Neuausgabe, ergänzt um einen illustrierten Anhang, wieder als Einzelpublikation vor. Max Planck. Sinn und Grenzen der exakten Wissenschaft. Vortrag gehalten im November 1941. Erstdruck: Johann Ambrosius Barth – Verlag, Leipzig 1942. Durchgesehener Neusatz, der Text dieser Ausgabe folgt der siebenten Auflage, Johann Ambrosius Barth – Verlag, Leipzig 1965. Für die Neuausgabe 2021 mit sieben Illustrationen versehen. Gebundene Ausgabe - Hardcover - mit Lesebändchen. Neuausgabe, LIWI Verlag, Göttingen 2021. LIWI Literatur- und Wissenschaftsverlag. (shrink)

Hegel und Heidegger teilen die Ansicht, dass das, was den Bedeutungsgehalt von Begriffen konstituiert, in ihrer unmittelbaren Verständlichkeit verborgen liegt. Dieser Gedanke bildet den Kern einer Konzeption der Negativität im Sinne einer Auffassung der Art und Weise, in der Sinn von Latenz geprägt ist. Hegel und Heidegger verstehen aber die Natur jener Latenz und das Verhältnis von Sinn und Begriff verschieden. Denn mit einer solchen Konzeption der Negativität ist die Frage verbunden, ob die Konstitution von Sinn begrifflich (...) artikulierbar ist und ob Sinn überhaupt begrifflich verfasst ist. Dieser Frage geht das Buch nach, indem es Hegel und Heidegger in ein Gespräch bringt, um den Stellenwert des begrifflichen Vermögens in der Konstitution und Artikulation von Sinn zu klären. Dabei wird eine Kritik an der Auffassung formuliert, dass die Quelle von Sinn nichtbegrifflich und unbegreiflich ist, und argumentiert, dass nur die begriffliche Artikulation von Bedeutungen die semantische Fülle der Welt verbürgt. (shrink)